In 1569 a new Polish-Lithuanian union was concluded in Lublin; the union strengthened the political, economic and cultural relationship between the Polish Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Both states were united in Krewo in 1385. Nevertheless, until 1569, the union was mostly personal -based on the stable rule of the Jagiellons. In Lublin it was converted into a closer federation of the two countries (both of which kept their names and territory) united from that moment on not only by one monarch elected by both Poles and Lithuanians, but also by one common noble parliament, common foreign policy and defence, the same monetary system (with distinct state treasuries) and similar administrative structures 1 . Th us, in Polish historiography the Union of Lublin is referred to as the real union to emphasise the fact of there being a variety of real bonds connecting the two states and nations 2 . On the other hand, the circumstances of the conclusion of the new union infl uenced the divergent attitudes of the Poles and Lithuanians and aff ected the relations between the nations, which is refl ected even in present times. Th at is why the circumstances and the fi nal outcome of the negotiations in Lublin should be recalled here since they determined the policy carried out by the Lithuanians during the interregna and following the death of the last Jagiellon on the Polish-Lithuanian throne.
At the beginning of the second half of the 16 th century, in the face of the war between Lithuania and Muscovy lasting from 1558, Lithuanian magnates, who To m a s z K e m p a [588] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l held a powerful position in the Grand Duchy of Lithuanian and were accustomed to having a major infl uence on key political decisions concerning the future of the state, decided to transform the union in such a way as to "to achieve the guarantee of military help [from the Poles] without restricting the country's sovereignty" 3 as Henryk Wisner put it. It must be added that some leading Lithuanian magnates identifi ed the interests of their families with the interests of the whole Lithuanian state. In other words, according to them what was good for them had to be good for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Th is kind of thinking may be traced in the correspondence of the most infl uential Lithuanian family -the Radziwiłłs 4 . In the meantime, the Polish nobility (especially the politically active faction centred around the movement of the so called "execution of the laws") and magnates tended to fall back on old union acts which stipulated the creation of one country so that the two countries -as expressed in the act of the union of 1 July 1569 -would become "one inseparable and identical body"
5
. Th e Polish king and the Grand Duke of Lithuania Sigismund Augustus 6 supported those aspirations from 1562. As the negotiations encountered some resistance from the Lithuanians, the monarch decided to accelerate the talks. He mainly wanted to motivate the magnates of Lithuanian and Ruthenia (from the areas of the Grand Duchy of Lithuanian) because the Lithuanian szlachta -according to the available sources 7 -generally supported a closer union with Poland not only for military reasons, but also in the hope of achieving a stronger political position in the country in order to counterbalance the Lithuanian magnates. What inspired the Polish noblemen was the szlachta of the Crown and the actions and successes of the movement of the "execution of laws".
Th e Polish monarch motivated the Lithuanian magnates in two ways. On the one hand, the king ensured them that Lithuania would not lose its sovereignty and the Lithuanians would keep all their freedoms and privileges. On the other hand, Sigismund Augustus tempted the Lithuanian and Ruthenian magnates to 3 
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Th e issue regarding "the reform of the union" of Lublin... [589] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l support a closer union with Poland by granting them various estates 8 . On the eve of the assembly in Lublin, the monarch made it clear that only those Lithuanian magnates who supported the union would be promoted to higher positions within the country.
At the same time, there were two Lithuanian families who held a leading position among the political elite of Lithuania -the Radziwiłł family and the Chodkiewicz family. Among the former, aft er the death of Mikołaj Radziwiłł "Czarny" ["the Black"] in 1565, the unquestioned leader was the Lithuanian chancellor and voivode of Vilnius Mikołaj Radziwiłł "Rudy" ["the Red"], while among the Chodkiewicz family the most infl uential person at the end of the 1560s remained the starost of Samogitia and the viceroy of Livonia -Jan Chodkiewicz. Th e latter was decidedly more inclined to accept the new closer relationship between Poland and Lithuania 9 . M. Radziwiłł "Rudy" is now considered to have been an opponent of the new union with the Crown, which was not entirely true. What is certain is that the Lithuanians in 1569 were quite willing to consolidate the union with Poland, but refused to accept the Polish terms and conditions. Th us, King Sigismund Augustus had to give the Lithuanians a written declaration before they arrived in Lublin that even if the talks with the Poles were to fall through, the Lithuanian magnates and szlachta would be allowed to leave Lublin 10 . Nevertheless, the Lithuanians in Lublin in January-February 1569 were under enormous pressure exerted by both the Polish king and the Polish szlachta along with some crown senators. Th e Poles, including the king, were determined to fi nish the union negotiations successfully. To their disappointment, they found out that almost all Lithuanians had left Lublin secretly during the night of 28 February -1 March having been encouraged by M. Radziwiłł "Rudy". Th e decision was quick and probably not well thought-out; the Lithuanians left Lublin in a hurry 11 . As wrote Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Sierotka" ["the Orphan"], even those who put forward the idea of the escape regretted it later, "A co sprawiło odjechanie ex zelo z Lublina naszych [...], jedno utracenie Wołynia z Podlasiem, to już luce meridiana clarius, pomnę ja, że żałowali sami ci, co byli odjechali" ["Th e departure of our people from Lublin caused [ 
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To m a s z K e m p a [590] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l luce meridian clarius; those who had left regretted it later" -transl. A. Chabros] 12 . Lithuanian leaders did not foresee the violent reaction of the Polish szlachta and the king. Aft er the Lithuanian had departed, the Polish nobility started to urge the monarch to unite both countries himself and incorporate Volhynia and Podlachia into Poland. Sigismund Augustus agreed to their demand and ordered senators and envoys from Podlachia who were still present in Lublin to swear their loyalty to the Crown, as did most of them on 9 March. Th e formal incorporation document was prepared later, but was issued with the date of 5 March. On 27 May the privilege announcing the incorporation of Volhynia to the Kingdom of Poland (along with the land of Bratslav -Eastern Podolia) 13 was issued. Another humiliation for the Lithuanians was the demand of the king that those Lithuanian magnates and szlachta owning estates in the incorporated lands should arrive in Lublin to swear their loyalty to the Crown and the Polish king under the threat of having the estates confi scated and the offi ces taken away 14 . Taking away such huge areas from the Lithuanians was an unexpected blow. As wrote M. Radziwiłł "Rudy" calling Lithuanian dignitaries for negotiations in Vilnius, what had happened in Lublin was "against privileges, law and freedoms of Lithuanians" 15 . Th e decisions made by the Polish king and the Poles at the seym in Lublin led to a clear polarisation of viewpoints among the Lithuanian magnates despite the fact that during prior negotiations in Lublin they had opposed the Poles in solidarity (excluding individual speeches given by magnates from Volhynia 16 ). Th e most infl uential Lithuanian dignitary -M. Radziwiłł "Rudy" -did not intend to continue negotiations with the Poles thinking that it would not change the course of events in Lublin 17 . At the same time, other Lithuanian magnates, includ-12 Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Sierotka" to Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Piorun", Nieśwież, 19 August 1597, Biblioteka Polskiej Akademii Nauk w Kórniku (further: BKórn.), manuscript 11617 (the manuscript consisting of a hundred separated copies -collected in some briefcases -made by Stanisław Bodniak prior to the out break of WWII includes complete or fragmentary copies of the correspondence of the group of the so called Petersburg revindicated collection of archival sources which returned to Poland in the 1930s owing to the peace treaty between Poland and Bolshevic Russia concluded in Riga in 1921; unfortunately, most of the archival sources were destroyed by the Nazis aft er the Warsaw Uprising in 1944; the copies of the letters now kept in the Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Kórnik and the Library of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow are now particularly precious). 
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Th e issue regarding "the reform of the union" of Lublin... [591] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l ing the representatives of the Chodkiewicz family (Jan, Hrehory and Jerzy) and the bishop of Vilnius Walerian Protasiewicz maintained that further negotiations with Poland should take place so that the decision about the incorporation of Podlachia and Volhynia be revoked. In return for this they were willing to make concessions about the new union with Poland. Th eir standpoint prevailed during the assembly of Lithuanian magnates and szlachta in Vilnius at the end of March 1569
18 from where envoys led by Jan Chodkiewicz were sent to Lublin 19 . Eventually, the decisions about the incorporation of Podlachia and Volhynia were not revoked. On the contrary, Poland incorporated (under the privilege of 6 June 1568) the extended area of the Kievan land as requested by Volhynians (excluding the Mazyr district which remained within the borders of Lithuania) 20 . In this way the Crown managed to share its borders with Muscovy, which later led to a greater involvement of the Poles in the eastern policy. Despite the next incorporation, the Lithuanians agreed to sign a new act of union with Poland the reasons being the pressure exerted by the Lithuanian szlachta and the fact that Lithuania was under military threat by Muscovy. It should be noted that for those Lithuanians who had returned to Lublin to fi nalise the negotiations about the new union, not signing the union act with Poland would have been a painful failure and would have weakened their position in Lithuania in relation to those Lithuanians who, like "Rudy", had boycotted further negotiations. Originally M. Radziwiłł "Rudy", like his nephew Mikołaj Radziwiłł "Sierotka", treated the concessions to Poland as treason, but later he reconciled with the king and probably made a vow on the new union during his meeting with the king in Knyszyn in the autumn of 1569 21 . Th e Union of Lublin -the resolutions of which were fi nally agreed on 29 June (the act was issued on 1 July) 1569 -introduced the election of one monarch common for both states who would be referred to as the King of Poland and the Grand Duke of Lithuania. Th e common ruler was to be crowned only once -in Cracow. Th e most important change in the mutual relationship between Poland and Lithuania became the creation of the common parliament (the seym) and the liquidation of the separate parliamentary institution in the Grand Duchy of Lithuanian. Th e Polish-Lithuanian seym of 1569 consisted of three parts: the king, the senate and the lower chamber consisting of noble envoys elected at sejmiks. 
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To m a s z K e m p a [592] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l outnumbered the number of Lithuanian representatives. Th e Polish preponderance did not correspond with the population numbers of both countries despite the fact that it resulted from the administrative divisions in the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (where territorial divisions resembled the Polish model as a result of the reforms carried out in the years 1565-1566). Among 140 senators, only 27 were connected with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, whilst among 114 members of the lower chamber (excluding representatives of Royal Prussia) only 44 were elected at Lithuanian sejmiks. Th e common senate did not admit representatives of Lithuanian royal families -members of the former Lithuanian council -including relatives of the Jagiellonians (princes of Slutsk) and district marshalls 22 . As Andrzej Rachuba pointed out, it can be stated that the Lithuanians were discriminated against in the common seym; on the other hand, as Andrzej B. Zakrzewski indicated -the disproportion between Polish and Lithuanian senators and envoys was attenuated by the rule of unanimity in votes 23 . Taking into consideration the circumstances in which the new union was concluded 24 and its fi nal resolutions, the 
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Th e issue regarding "the reform of the union" of Lublin... [593] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l territory (about 200,000 km 2 ) 27 . Th e Lithuanians felt rancour towards King Sigismund Augustus and directed their criticism mainly towards the king. According to Lithuanian magnates, the king submitted to the pressure of the Poles: "Nie było nic polskiej krwie w Panie naszym, jedna się litewska z włoską zmieszała, a jedno, iż polska edukacja przystąpiła, duże Litwa to na siebie czuje i czuć będzie, jeśli Boże zmiłowanie nie przystąpi" ["there was no Polish blood in our King -only Lithuanian and Italian, but the Poles instructed the king, as Lithuania feels and will continue to feel unless God has mercy on us" -transl. A.Ch.]
28
. Nevertheless, most accusations were directed against the king. As M.K. Radziwiłł "Rudy" wrote about the Poles' insistence on the union (even before its fi nal conclusion) under Polish conditions: "Że to już nie unią z nimi tworzyć, co by dwaj, Litwin z Polakiem, czynić między sobą mieli, ale co Polak sobie utworzył na swe dobro, a moje złe, to ty Litwinie poprzysiąż, wyznaj, potwierdź jego zwierzchność nad sobą, a swoje poddaństwo jemu" ["the union created with them is not a union between a Pole and a Lithuanian, but a Polish union established for the good of Poland and for the wrong of Lithuania; you Lithuanians swear, confess and confi rm Polish supremacy and serfdom to the Pole" -transl. A. Ch.] 29 . M.K. Radziwiłł "Sierotka" in a letter to his brother-in-law from the Crown Mikołaj Mielecki stated that the "union exasperated" the Lithuanians rather than "conciliated" them 30 . Th e sensation of extreme humiliation felt by the Lithuanian magnates -in contrast to the Polish enthusiasm about the union 31 -signifi cantly aff ected Polish-Lithuanian relations in the subsequent two decades, including the key periods of three subsequent interregna which took place in the Rzeczpospolita in the years 1572-1573, 1575-1576, 1586-1587. Several years aft er the Lublin seym, the Lithuanians oft en associated all the evil with the union and exaggerated its negative eff ects on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which is refl ected in the words of M.K. Radziwiłł "Sierotka" written in the letter to his other Polish brother-in-law Jan Zamoyski: "Bo jako pomnę, od unii sprawy litewskie, jeśli nie ludibrio u dworu [królewskiego -T. Nevertheless, it must be underlined that despite their heavy criticism, Lithuanian magnates did not want to break the Union of Lublin. Even the biggest critics of the union did not intend to undermine its foundations in the face of the war with Muscovites. In practice it meant that Lithuanian dignitaries did not wish to alter the content of the act of union of 1 July 1569 in which it read that its regulations "shall never be touched and modifi ed" 35 . 
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Th e issue regarding "the reform of the union" of Lublin...
[595]
w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l intention to "reform the union". Th is enigmatic term in fact meant an attempt to reclaim the lands lost for the benefi t of the Crown in 1569 (Volhynia, the Kievan land, the land of Bratslav and Podlachia), which was the main reason why the Lithuanians felt humiliated. Although the incorporation of the territories into Poland did not directly concern the substance of the union of both countries, it was naturally connected with the union 36 . Moreover, as one may conclude from the correspondence of Lithuanian magnates, some Lithuanians understood the term "reform of the union" in a broader context: as an improvement of mutual Polish-Lithuanian relations which, according to the Lithuanians, would lead to the Lithuanian becoming an equal partner to the Crown. Th e intention was to specify some provisions of the union for the benefi t of the Grand Duchy of Lithuanian (the act of the union was in some points too general).
During all the three interregna, the Lithuanians postulated the reclaim of the lands taken away from them in 1569. Th ey also expressed this to candidates to the Polish-Lithuanian throne 37 . It must be noted that the situation in the lands incorporated into Poland varied. Podlachia was to a large extent Polonised thanks to settlers from Masovia who had been settling in Podlachia for a few centuries 38 . Th e inhabitants of Podlachia considered it natural that the territory should belong to the Polish Crown 39 . Th e Lithuanians were inclined to resign from their claims to Podlachia, for the part of it which included Brest and Kamianets remained within the boundaries of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania aft er 1569.
Undoubtedly, the Lithuanians were surprised that at the seym of Lublin the Volhynian szlachta eagerly supported Volhynia's belonging to Poland. It turned out that the Volhynian magnates had not questioned Volhynia' belonging to the Polish Crow and the ratifi cation of the union 40 . Th e szlachta of Volhynia believed that Poland would protect them more eff ectively against the Tatars or Muscovites. Th is conclusion may drawn from the fact that Volhynians at the seym of Lublin put forward the initiative to incorporate also the Kievan land, which -as we know -did in fact take place 42 . Th e Volhynian magnates were driven by diff erent motives. It must be remembered that Volhyn was a territory from which many royal families of Ruthenian origin came. Some of them took pride in being the descendants of the Rurik dynasty. Volhynia enjoyed some autonomy in comparison with other lands; separate local conventions (seyms) were held in Volhynia, and the territory had its own unique offi ces such as the marshal of the Volhynian land 43 . Volhynian magnates were of Christian Orthodox denomination and as such since the times of Władysław Jagiełło [Jogaila] they had been forbidden to hold the highest positions in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania such as the voivode and castellan of Vilnius and the voivode and castellan of Trakai 44 . It was not until 1563 that King Sigismund Augustus lift ed the ban 45 . It must be underlined that this unequal treatment of the Orthodox Christians in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania did not result from the dominant position of the Roman Catholic Church, but was the eff ect of the Catholic Lithuanian magnates who were protecting their privileged position in the country. Th is was particularly visible during the rule of the last two Jagiellons, who had to confi rm the previously mentioned ban a few times at the request of Catholic Lithuanian magnates (in 1529, 1547, 1551) 46 [597]
w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l that the ban had been broken twice in relation to hetman Konstanty Ostrogski, who -as an Orthodox Christian -was fi rst appointed the castellan of Vilnius in 1512, and in 1522 he became the voivode of Trakai
47
. Th e relations between Lithuanian and Ruthenian magnates from the lands incorporated into Poland in 1569 were not ideal and depended to a large extent on the personal connections between them. From the available source it may be inferred that leading Lithuanian dignitaries looked down on the Volhynians, which is illustrated by the words of M. Radziwiłł "Rudy" written to his nephew when he instructed him to act like a "Radziwiłł a Litwin urodzony, a nie Podlaszanin ani Wołyniec" ["Radziwiłł and a man born in Lithuania, not like a man from Podlachia or Volhynia" -transl. A. Ch.] 48 while taking decisions at the seym of Lublin. As can be seen, contrary to what Lithuanian dignitaries maintained, there were few bonds between Volhynian magnates and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Some of the richest magnates, such as the Ostrogskis, were related to Polish families of magnates 49 . Moreover, in the 16 th century, prior to the union of Lublin, the Polish infl uence would spread in Volhynia 50 . On the other hand, "native" Lithuanians acquired estates in Volhynia, as was the case with the Radziwiłłs, the Dorohojstajskis, the Chreptowicz family, the Kiszkas or the Sapiehas 
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To m a s z K e m p a [598] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l In the context of the "improvement of the union" two issues were the most signifi cant for Lithuanian dignitaries at the beginning of the interregnum. Th e fi rst problem concerned the demonstration of total solidarity of all Lithuanians against the Polish party, notwithstanding all the diff erences, political divisions and personal confl icts which had occurred among Lithuanians. Jan Hlebowicz feared that "aby się nie cieszyli w Polscze, żeśmy tu sami z sobą w Litwie rozerwani" ["Poles would be glad that the Lithuanians are divided as a nation" -transl. A. Ch.] 53 . Om the other hand, leading Lithuanian dignitaries hoped that the Poles would meet their demands owing to divisions among Polish magnates in the period of the fi rst interregnum. As was pointed out by Henryk Lulewicz, Lithuanian magnates underestimated the importance of the Polish szlachta, concentrating on establishing contacts with individual groups of the senators in the Crown 54 , which refl ected their attitude to the Lithuanian szlachta. Th e other problem concerned the necessity of convincing inhabitants of the lost lands (the szlachta and magnates) to support this claim. In practice, the Lithuanians had to persuade the magnates that it would be better for them to live in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania rather than in the Polish Crown. Both problems turned out to be very hard to deal with. While the Lithuanians managed to reach unanimity in the fi rst issue especially during the period of the fi rst interregnum, the second problem was much harder to solve. Let us have a closer look at both key issues.
Th e most important Lithuanian dignitaries, expecting the death of King Sigismund Augustus, a few months before his death led to the conclusion of the socalled family transaction involving three leading representatives of two competing families: the Radziwiłłs ("Rudy" and "Sierotka" as representatives of two lines of the family) and the Chodkiewicz family (the starost of Samogitia Jan) 55 . Th e exact date of the conclusion of this family agreement remains unknown, but it must have been signed during the seym which commenced on 15 March 1572. Th e main initiator of the agreement was M.K. Radziwiłł "Sierotka" and the papal legate in Poland Giovanni Francesco Commendone 56 participated in it. Th e latter insisted 53 Jan Hlebowicz to Jan Chodkiewicz, Mińsk, 14 January 1576, BKórn., manuscript 11617. Jan Karol Chodkiewicz expressed a similar fear in 1608: "Dawno Polacy na tym są, aby nas, wielkie familie w Litwie, powaśniwszy do zniszczenia przywiedli, aby tak snadnie mogli według myśli Litwą kierować" ["For a long time Poles have wanted to drive us -the greatest Lithuanian families -to family feuds and destroy us to easily run Lithuania the way they want to" -trans. 
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Th e issue regarding "the reform of the union" of Lublin... [599] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l that at the seym of 1572 (on the Day of Resurrection 6 April 57 , both "Sierotka" (who already converted into Catholicism in 1566 without publicity 58 ) and J. Chodkiewicz would announce publicly their conversion from Calvinism into Catholicism. M. Radziwiłł "Rudy" remained a Calvinist. G.F. Commendone, sent to the Rzeczpospolita by Pope Pius V, aimed at establishing the pro-Habsburg party in the context of the upcoming interregnum. Th e "family transaction", embracing the most important representatives of the most powerful magnate families in Lithuania, was one of the most essential elements of this plan. Th e signatories vowed "do gardła i utracenia ostatniej majętności jeden drugiego nie odstępować, ale od tych czasów wiecznie z sobą przestawać, przeciw każdemu nieprzyjacielowi [ 59 . Taking into consideration the participation of the papal legate in the whole event, it must be added that this family pact was only a preliminary stage of the final agreement signed at the end of the seym by G.F. Commendone, J. Chodkiewicz and "Sierotka". Th e latter two, in the presence of the papal legate and as representatives of Lithuania, pledged to support Emperor Maximilian II's son -Archduke Ernest -as a candidate to the throne. It must be noted that M. Radziwiłł "Rudy" did not participate in this stage of the agreement. As a Calvinist he was not prepared to support the candidacy of the archduke who represented the family associated with Catholicism and its more radical "militant type". Th at is why special arguments were needed to convince the infl uential Lithuanian magnate to support the Habsburg archduke. "Sierotka" -his nephew -provided such arguments to persuade his uncle. Finally, "Sierotka", J. Chodkiewicz and M. Radziwiłł "Rudy" along with other Lithuanian magnates intended to conduct the election of Ernest in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and through his marriage with Anna Jagiellon, Sigismund Augustus's sister, they wanted to impose upon the Poles not only the king, but also the conditions under which the union of Lublin should be maintained. ] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l Lithuanian dignitaries were sure that "the Poles, as they did in the times of Sigismund I 60 will accept the same king as the Lithuanians" 61 . Just in case, at the meeting with G.F. Commendone, J. Chodkiewicz and "Sierotka" committed themselves to providing an army of 20 000 soldiers who would support the elector if need be. Th e papal legate tried to dissuade them from military action for fear it should lead to the dissolution of the union. He advised to leave the decision to the emperor and Ernest himself 62 . Contrary to appearances, the Lithuanians did not mean to break the union despite the risk the plan involved.
It should be emphasised that at the beginning of the interregnum aft er the death of Sigismund Augustus, the Lithuanian magnates were quite hostile towards the Poles. On the other hand, even the most radical of them such as "Sierotka" -the creator of the plan of the separate election of Archduke Ernest -wanted to maintain a close political bond with Poland. It was M.K. Radziwiłł who, a few days aft er the death of the king, instructed "Rudy" to make his envoys ensure "aby panowie bracia wiedzieli, że my nie tylko abyśmy mieli unią targać, ale ją jeszcze potwierdzamy, a dawamy znać o niebezpieczeństwach, które i Polsce, tak jako i Litwie, zaszkodzić mogą" ["that the Poles know that we not only refuse to tear the union, but we confi rm it and shall let you know about the dangers that could threaten Poland and Lithuania" -transl. 
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Th e issue regarding "the reform of the union" of Lublin... [601] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l a very short time during the third interregnum when its main creator "Sierotka" and his brother the cardinal Jerzy Radziwiłł 65 tried to revive it to support another Habsburg -Archduke Maximilian. However, the plan did not succeed for several reasons. Firstly, the Habsburgs -particularly Emperor Maximilian II -opposed it as they feared that it might put off many of their advocates among the Polish magnates, and might eventually lead to a war between Poland and Lithuania
. Anna Jagiellon did not wish to take part in the plan, either. During subsequent interregna her relations with Lithuanian dignitaries were quite cold 67 . She even threatened to disclose the letters concerning the project of the separate election 68 . Finally, some senators also resisted taking part in the execution of the plan (such as the bishop of Vilnius Walerian Protaszewicz, the subchancellor Ostafi i Wołłowicz) as they did not want to spoil the good relations between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland.
Th is fear was visible, for instance, during the so-called scandal of Rudniki (the name comes from the convention of Lithuanians in Rudniki in September 1572). Political opponents of the Radziwiłłs and the Chodkiewicz family -the castellan of Minsk Jan Hlebowicz and the duke of Slutsk Jerzy Olelkowicz presented the Poles with a forged document trying to convince them that leading Lithuanian dignitaries had wanted to carry out a separatist election of the Muscovite tsar in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which did not in fact take place. However, Lithuanian dignitaries undoubtedly breached the union of Lublin in Rudniki. Although the act of the union gave both states -the Crown and Lithuania -the right to send diplomatic envoys to other countries, it required the agreement of the other party 69 . 
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To m a s z K e m p a [602] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l of the fact how far the Lithuanian political leaders -M. Radziwiłł "Rudy" and J. Chodkiewicz -had violated the regulations of the union, the case gave rise to heated reactions on both the Polish and Lithuanian sides. Many Lithuanian dignitaries (i.e. W. Protaszewicz and O. Wołłowicz) expressed their fears concerning the future of the union and Polish-Lithuanian relations 71 . Th e reaction of the Poles and some Lithuanian dignitaries astonished "Rudy" and J. Chodkiewicz to such a point that they decided to stop the Lithuanian envoy Michał Harabuda even though he was already on his way to Muscovy 72 . However, it must be underlined that the most signifi cant aim of M. Harabuda's mission was to prolong the armistice in the war with Muscovy (it was due to fi nish at the end of June 1573), which was of utmost importance for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the period of interregnum. Th e Lithuanians did not hesitate to start negotiations with the Muscovites again without the permission of the Poles in 1587 at the site of the election soon aft er the new monarch had been chosen (aft er the split election). Th e talks with the Muscovite envoys ended on 19 August in the signing of a fi ft een-year truce in the name of the whole Rzeczpospolita despite the fact that the negotiations had taken place without the participation of the representatives of the Crown 73 . It must be added that the Poles were unwilling to blow up the scandal of Rudniki, for they wanted to strengthen the union of Lublin 74 , which was accepted by all Lithuanian magnates with great relief.
It is also worth noting that the Lithuanians tried to underline the unity in their "national" camp when they gathered for the election 75 . Th ey showed off their distinction from the Crown by setting up their camp in a separate place. It also happened at the convent of Stężyca where Henry III of Valois was dethroned 76 . Th e attempts to evince the solidarity and unity against Poland were not always eff ective in the face of diff erences between Lithuanian magnates and the szlachta. 
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Th e issue regarding "the reform of the union" of Lublin... [603] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l Th e second important issue from the point of view of the union's improvement in the subsequent interregna was the necessity to convince the magnates and the szlachta from the lands incorporated into the Crown in 1569 to support the idea of the lands being given back to the Grand Duchy of Lithuanian. Th is turned out to be a very tough task.
Despite the fact that the Lithuanians wanted to regain all the lands lost in 1569, at the beginning of the interregnum they focused mainly on regaining Volhynia 77 . Th is was the most populated and the richest area of all the areas incorporated by Poland. Apart from that, the Lithuanians thought that the Volhynian magnates would be easier to cooperate with than the szlachta from other territories taken away from Lithuania
78
. Th e Lithuanian dignitaries hoped that the Volhynian magnates might attract the szlachta not only from Volhynia, but also from the Kievan land and the land of Bratslav as many Volhynian magnates held their estates there along with their noble clientele (landless szlachta).
In July 1572 at the convent of Lutsk, the szlachta of Volhynia clearly supported the idea of Volhynia being a part of Poland. Th e envoy of Lithuanian dignitaries Aleksander Chodkiewicz, who was staying in Volhynia at that time, stated that "niemal wszystka szlachta wołyńska na tym teraźniejszym zjachaniu swym, gdy czytano w uniwersale knyszyńskim, że Wasz Mościowie [senatorowie litewscy -T.K.] o Wołyń i Podlasze na elekcyji mówić chcą, krzyknęła, iż nie chcą przysiąg swych łamać i przeciw sumnieniu swemu co poczynać i jakoż to wiem za pewne, że ich wielka część jest nieżyczliwych litewskiemu państwu" ["almost all the Volhynian szlachta at the convent shouted they would not break their vows and would not act against their conscience when the letters of Knyszyn were being read announcing that You Lords [Lithuanian senators -T.K.] wanted to speak about Volhynia and Podlachia at the election; I know it is certain that most of them do not support the Lithuanian state" -transl. A.Ch.] 79 . Th e Kievan szlachta took a similar stand at the sejmik before the seym of 1572 prior to the death of Sigismund Augustus 80 . Similar resolutions were signed at the convent of Hlyniany where the szlachta arrived from the Ruthenian lands of the Crown (mainly from the Podolian and Ru-77 Yet, the Lithuanian court treasurer Ławryn Woyna (a member of Jan Chodkiewicz's clientele (landless szlachta)) indicated the necessity for the leading Lithuanian politicians to communicate with "noblemen from Volhynia, the Kievan land, the Bratslav land and Podlachia" in the context of the future election of the monarch, Ławryn Woyna to Jan Chodkiewicz, Łomża, 28 September 1572, BKórn., manuscript 11617. 78 Apart from that, Lithuanians diminished the signifi cance of the Volhynian szlachta if Jan Chodkiewicz commented that representatives of a few ducal families (the Czartoryskis, the Ostrogskis, the Wiśniowieckis, the Zbaraskis) "have Volhynia in manibus", a letter of Jan Chodkiewicz to an unknown recipient (not dated), BKórn., manuscript 11617. 79 Aleksander Chodkiewicz to Jan Chodkiewicz, Dojlidy, 6 October 1572, BKórn., manuscript 11617. 80 83 . At the coronations seym of Henry III Valois at the beginning of 1574 the envoys from the voivodeships incorporated into the Crown declared that they even "wolą pójść do niewoli raczej, niż wracać pod jarzmo Litwinów" ["prefer to go into captivity rather than return under the Lithuanian yoke" -transl. A. Ch.] 84 . Moreover, during the fi rst interregnum, the Volhynian szlachta cooperated closely with the szlachta of the Ruthenian and Beltz voivodeships located before 1569 within the boundaries of the Crown 85 . Later, the cooperation developed and gave rise to migrations and settlement (particularly from the territories of the former Red Ruthenia -Halych to Volhynia) 86 . It was a conscious or subconscious reference to the traditions of the common state within the monarchy of the Romanovichs -a branch of the Rurik dynasty in the 13 in the ancient community and to convince the others whose will goes to another direction to join us [...]. We do ask You Lords to ensure that when we express our willingness to Polish magnates to stay with You Lords, we could feel safe about our lives and estates even when You Lords are not looking, for diffi culty and great danger will be faced by us" -transl. A.Ch.] 87 . Th e fi rst part of the extract of A. Chodkiewicz's letter may prove that at least some noblemen from Volhynia advocated the Lithuanian plans to "reform the union" and to return Volhynia (and other annexed territories) to Lithuania. Nevertheless, the reservation made at the end of the letter clearly points out that the Volhynian dukes were merely leading the Lithuanian dignitaries on with empty promises. It goes beyond doubt that that they did not intend to risk their political career. It must be added that during the interregnum none of the dukes mentioned in A. Chodkiewicz's letter openly cooperated with the Lithuanians 88 . Th e most infl uential of the Volhynian magnates -the voivode of Kiev Konstanty Ostrogski -was the least willing to cooperate with the Lithuanians. At a private meeting with A. Chodkiewicz, he described his personal grievances against the Lithuanian magnates. However, he also stated that the Lithuanians "should not doubt his belief in the Rzeczpospolita of Lithuania". He expressed his fear of not being left stranded aft erwards "aby się wyrwawszy z tym przed swaty, na koszu potym nie został" 89 It seems that among all Volhynian magnates it was the voivode of Volhynia Michał Czartoryski who was favourably inclined towards the plan of returning the incorporated lands to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Th e reason might have been the fact that he was J. Chodkiewicz's brother-in-law. During the second interregnum (1574-1575) he promised the Lithuanians to persuade the szlachta of Volhynia to return it to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Nevertheless, as suggested by H. Lulewicz, the political infl uence of the young duke was limited and there is no evidence that he was supported by a group of dissatisfi ed Volhynian szlachta who wanted Volhynia to belong to Lithuania. M. Czartoryski hoped to win J. Chodkiewicz's trust by boasting of his political supporters 92 . What is more, Lithuanian dignitaries were divided among themselves about the problem of issuing a written guarantee (they referred to it as "bail") for Volhynians stating that they would oppose the Poles collectively even if such resistance should result in deteriorating the relations with the Crown. One of the dignitaries who were against signing such a guarantee was the bishop of Vilnius W. Protaszewicz 93 . Despite all the above, "Rudy" and J. Chodkiewicz still insisted on persuading Volhynians to support the plan to "reform the union": "A ktemu dobrze by było, abyś Wasz Mość chocia od siebie a ode mnie tylko raczył kazać napisać listy na Wołyń, jeden do książąt i wojewod, a drugi do szlachty, animując ich [. 
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Th e issue regarding "the reform of the union" of Lublin... [607] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l infl uence Volhynians again in order to win them over to the plan to re-incorporate Volhynia to Lithuania.
Th ere is only one offi cial document available that may, but does not have to, indicate that several Volhynian and Kievan magnates attempted to act according to the intentions of Lithuanian dignitaries a few months later. Th e document is a declaration issued at the election seym (30 April 1573) by an offi cial French envoy the bishop Jean de Monluc where he declared -in the name of the future king Henry III Valois -his intention to maintain the rights and privileges of the Volhynian, Kievan and Bratslavian voivodeships and to reincorporate them into Lithuania 95 . Th e recipients of the declaration were the most important dignitaries from the voivodeships: the voivode of Kiev K. Ostrogski, the voivode of Bratslav A. Wiśniowiecki, the voivode of Volhynia Bohusz Korecki, the castellan of Bratslav Wasyl Zahorowski, the castellan of Kiev Paweł Sapieha. All of them, with the exception of P. Sapieha, were connected with Volhynia and partly with the Kievan land as they held their estates there. Th e document also included a paragraph concerning the maintenance of privileges and freedoms of the "Greek religion". Th e problem was that K. Ostrogski, the most infl uential dignitary, did not want to support the candidacy of Henry for religious reasons. On 11 May near Grochowo with a few non-Catholic magnates he attempted to elect another candidate to the Polish throne. Eventually, the group of "secessionists" not supported by the szlachta returned to the main election fi eld and elected the French candidate 96 . It seems that the creation of the declaration of 30 April might have taken place on the initiative of the leading Lithuanian dignitaries (perhaps even without asking the Volhynian dukes), for a few days earlier on 26 April 1573 the French envoys J. de Monluc and Guy de Lansac issued a document which guaranteed the maintenance of privileges and freedoms of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Th e document also included the promise to reincorporate Volhynia, the Kievan land, the Bratslavian land and part of Podlachia into Lithuania 97 . Irrespective of how we would interpret the declaration of 30 April 1573, it did not change the positive attitude of the Volhynians towards the union of Lublin or Volhynia's belonging to Poland. Th e majority of the politically active Volhynian szlachta and magnates from Volhynia, the Bratslavian land and the Kievan land expressed their positive attitude towards the decisions of the seym of Lublin. For most noblemen it was essential that the "incorporation privilege" sworn in 1569 by Sigismund Augustus guaranteed the autonomy of Volhynia and Ukrainian voivodeships within the Crown ] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l Ruthenia as the third element of the Rzeczpospolita 99 . For Volhynian magnates it was also important that the union had not changed the social hierarchy in Volhynia. Representatives of ducal families still constituted the majority there, for they owned large territories and estates. Jarosław Pełeński rightly points out that the union enabled Ruthenian magnates from the lands incorporated into Poland in 1569 to "acquire more signifi cance and prestige" 100 . Very soon, representatives of the most outstanding Volhynian families such as the Ostrogskis, the Zbaraskis, the Wiśniowieckis, the Zasławskis, and later the Czartoryskis were politically promoted and started to hold the highest positions in the country having become part of the political elite of Poland 101 . In Podlachia, the Lithuanians did not manage to win the support for their plans. Th ey encountered not only a hostile attitude from the local szlachta, but were also opposed by two local senators: the voivode of Podlachia Mikołaj Kiszka (from a very well known Lithuanian family) and the castellan of Podlachia Adam Kosiński
102
. Moreover, the szlachta of Podlachia supported the idea of a slow shift of borders for the benefi t of Poland, which was caused by the fact that some noblemen with their estates in the Grand Duchy of Lithuanian near the border with Poland, such as the Pole Kasper Dembiński (the son of the crown chancellor Walenty Dembiński), married to a Lithuanian Maryna Kopciówna, tried to make their estates fall under the jurisdiction of Polish offi ces and courts. Th ey very oft en succeeded, which met with strong opposition from the Lithuanians 103 and resulted in the creation of border committees by the seym (in the years: 1579, 1589, 1591, 1596, 1598, 1601, 1607), the aim of which was to strictly defi ne the borders between the Podlachian voivodeship belonging to the Crown and the Brest-Lithuanian voivodeship 104 . 74 Th e issue regarding "the reform of the union" of Lublin...
[609]
w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l Th e opposition of the Podlachians against the re-incorporation of their province into Lithuania was so great that the Lithuanians quickly realised that their demands would not bear fruit and private contacts they limited themselves to expressing the necessity to re-incorporate into Lithuania only the remaining three voivodeships (the Volhynian, the Kievan and Bratslavian provinces). However, in offi cial documents presented to the Polish party or to candidates to the throne they also insisted on Podlachia being returned to Lithuania. Th e demand to reincorporate all the lost lands appeared regularly during the three interregna, but from the second interregnum it was put forward only formally 105 , for Lithuanians had lost hope of success in view of the protests of the Poles and other inhabitants of the province. Later it was no longer expressed in offi cial contacts with the Polish party or the king, but the Lithuanians knew how to remind the Poles about the humiliation they had experienced while the vast lands were taken away from them. When the Poles demanded that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania contribute in the costs of the defence of the lost lands against Tatars, the szlachta of Minsk instructed their envoys to the seym of 1601 "Ich Mościowie panowie koronni za wzięciem Wołynia, Podlasia i Kijowa na się przyjąć raczyli" [that the costs "were taken upon by You Lords along with the incorporation of Volhynia, Podlachia and Kiev" -transl. A.Ch.]
106
. It is also a good example to illustrate how the Lithuanians distanced themselves from the matters of the Crown, which constituted a characteristic attitude for the Lithuanian policy in the period aft er the union of Lublin, as underlined by H. Lulewicz
107
. It must be added that during the fi rst two interregna, aft er the death of Sigismund Augustus when the Lithuanians knew they would not regain the lost lands, they insisted that the revenues from the provinces lost in 1569 be sent to the Lithuanian treasury 108 . Naturally, their eff orts were fruitless. As a result, the most important Lithuanian demand made to "reform the union" during the period of three interregna aft er the death of Sigismund Augustus was never achieved. Th e Lithuanian magnates expressed also other demands towards Poland and candidates to the throne of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (or to kings-electors). Some of the demands were practical, while others were only to add prestige to Lithuania.
Another "territorial" claim put forward by the Lithuanians during the three interregna was the demand to incorporate Livonia into Lithuania. Th e demand became particularly signifi cant during the third interregnum. Originally, the status of the province which was the cause of a military confl ict between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (and soon the whole Rzeczpospolita) and the Muscovites, was not 105 H. Lulewicz, Gniewów o unię, pp. 283. Still, at the beginning of 1577, e.g. M. Radziwiłł "Rudy" seemed not to believe in the possibility of regaining Volhynia, see: Mikołaj Radziwiłł "Rudy" to Jan Chodkiewicz and Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Sierotka", Kojdanów, 28 January 1577, BKórn., manuscript 11617. 106 
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To m a s z K e m p a [610] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l precisely defi ned. According to the Lithuanians, from 1566 -the seym of Grodno -Livonia was connected only with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Th e Poles did not agree with it as they considered the province to be a Polish-Lithuanian condominium. Th e status of the province was defi ned in this way at the seym of Lublin despite the protest of the Lithuanians
109
. In practice, in the next few years Livonia was governed by both Lithuanian dignitaries (the Livonian viceroy from 1566 was Jan Chodkiewicz) and the Livonian szlachta
110
. However, the Lithuanians did accept such a distribution of power, for they wanted to hold all the offi ces of starost connected with the province and dismiss the local szlachta of German origin 111 . Th e situation changed when the Muscovite army conquered most of Livonia (north of the Daugava river) in 1577 and the army of the Rzeczpospolita managed to regain the territory during the wars of Báthory (1579-1581). Stefan Báthory treated Livonia as a conquered territory, which did not force him to respect earlier regulations concerning Livonia made during the reign of Sigismund Augustus 112 . As a result, the Lithuanians lost (1582) their infl uence in the province for the benefi t of Poland and some Hungarian commanders participating in the war with Muscovy, which forced the Lithuanians to insist on Livonia being incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
113
. Th e problem was solved in January 1588, which I shall discuss later on.
Some Lithuanian demands from the period following the union of Lublin concerned a clear delimitation of competence between Polish and Lithuanian offi cials in a such a way that Lithuania should not be harmed. At the seyms of 1570 and 1571 there were confl icts between Poles and Lithuanians concerning the division of competence of the Polish and Lithuanian marshalls (the great crown marshall and the court marshall) despite the fact that "the order according to which crown and Lithuanian marshalls are to conduct" enacted soon aft er the union of Lublin (19 July 1569) stipulated that in Poland the most important were crown marshalls while in Lithuania the biggest competence was given to Lithuanian marshalls. However, the problem was that the kings spent most of their time in Poland, which did not provide Lithuanian marshalls with many opportunities to exercise their power. Th e Poles did not want to allow the Lithuanian marshalls to take over the responsibilities during the absence of the great crown marshall if the court marshall of the Crown was present at the court. Th e confl ict of competence concerning As I mentioned earlier, Lithuanians aft er 1569 lost their separate seym whose scope of duty was taken over by the general seym (sejm walny) despite the fact that the maintenance of a separate parliamentary system in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania constituted one of the most important demands during the negotiations at the seym of Lublin. Although during the interregna the Lithuanians did not express this demand in their negotiations with Poland, they invariably underlined the necessity of the existence of a separate Lithuanian seym in their contacts with the Habsburgs concerning the particular election of Archduke Ernest in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 116 . It must be noted that it was a far-reaching demand which affected the foundations of the union of Lublin; that is why the Lithuanians refrained from discussing it with the Polish party. Irrespective of the legal solutions, the practice showed that although the most important decisions concerning the Rzeczpospolita and Lithuania were made at the general seym, in the fi rst two decades aft er the union of 1569 in the . When later it turned out that the Lithuanians did not feel the need to gather at separate Lithuanian convocations, the institution slowly disappeared in the second half of the 17 th century. What is more, convocations were to some extent boycotted by the Lithuanian szlachta, for magnates had too big an infl uence on decisions made during convocations 120 .
As the most important decisions concerning the whole Rzeczpospolita and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were made at the general seym, the Lithuanians insisted that such seyms be held not only in the Crown. In fact, aft er 1569 general seyms took place in the Crown (mostly in Warsaw) despite the fact that theoretically, according to the act of the union of Lublin, the choice of the site of the seym belonged to the king and the "crown and Lithuanian council". In practice, however, it was the monarch who decided where the general seym were to be held. Th e Lithuanians wanted every second (later every third) seym to take place in Lithuanian (in Grodno or Brest). Moreover, they urged the king to reside every third years in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
121
. Th e latter demand took into account the division of the Rzeczpospolita not into two federal states -Poland and Lithuania-but into three provinces: Lesser Poland [Małopolska], Greater Poland [Wielkopolska] and Lithuania. Such a division was refl ected in the fact that every third marshall of the seym was Lithuanian (elected -like the marshalls from Lesser Poland and Greater Poland -by all envoys). Th is rule was enforced from 1574 despite the protest of Lithuanians who wanted their representative to be a marshall of every second seym alternately with the representative of the Crown
122
. Th e demand to hold every third seym in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (at least de iure) was not fulfi lled until 1673 when the seym constitution solved this problem 123 . In subsequent decades some seyms in the last quarter of the 17 th century and in the 18 th century took place in Grodno. It should be added that for Lithuanians another very prosaic problem was essential; namely, Lithuanians (especially at the seym of 1570) competed with Poles about the distribution of inns in Warsaw where seym were held, which for them [613]
w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l was a matter of prestige. In later periods at least this issue ceased to arouse heated emotions 124 . As far as the composition of the seym of the Rzeczpospolita was concerned, the Lithuanians (who constituted a signifi cant minority in the senate) wanted to extend the upper chamber adding to it Lithuanian district marshalls whose importance would be equal to crown minor castellans. However, the Polish party rejected the proposal 125 . Later, when the personal confl ict between M. Radziwiłł "Rudy" -J. Chodkiewicz and the late king Sigismund Augustus's next of kin -Duke of Slutks Jerzy Olelkowicz -was obviated, the Lithuanians struggled to allow him and his off spring to belong to the senate. Earlier dukes of Slutsk, like the other closest relatives of the king, were obligatorily members of the Lithuanian council of noblemen. Nevertheless, the Poles argued that the Duke of Slutsk would be the only one to sit in the senate owing to his title and not the offi ce he held, which would constitute a dangerous precedence. For this reason, the Lithuanians did not manage to achieve anything in this matter 126 . Lithuanian dignitaries remained underrepresented in the senate.
During the interregna the most essential Lithuanian demands concerned everything that could lead to the emphasis of the signifi cance of the Grand Duchy of Lithuanian in the election of the common monarch. Th us, the Lithuanians wanted the election of the new monarch of the Rzeczpospolita to take place nearer the Lithuanian border -in Parczew (possibly also in Lithuania or Węgrów) -not near Warsaw had been the case. Th ey argued that a long time ago both parties had agreed to choose "Parczew for the site of common seyms as was established in the times of the union" 127 . H. Lulewicz points out that this repeatedly expressed demand in the subsequent interregna constituted indirectly the insistence on the reincorporation of the lost lands, for the territories incorporated into Poland had been situated on the Polish-Lithuanian border before 1569 128 . It is not known to what an extent the Poles understood this allusion of Lithuanians. Th e truth is this demand was never fulfi lled by Poland.
Th e Lithuanians also questioned the legality of convening a convocation assembly during the interregna (the time and site of the election were normally decided there) by the primate of Poland, who as early as the fi rst interregnum acquired the title of interrex -the most important person in the Rzeczpospolita. 
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To m a s z K e m p a [614] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l Th e Lithuanian dignitaries cited the act of the union which in fact said nothing about convening convocations. Th ey also maintained that if such a convention was to take place, its date should be consulted with them, while the primate Jakub Uchański believed that this right belonged exclusively to him as interrex. Finally, the Lithuanians wanted such a convention to be organised as close to the PolishLithuanian border as possible. Th e Lithuanians questioned the correctness of the procedure of convening convocations in all the three interregna, which resulted in their refusal to participate in convocation assemblies. Th ey only sent their envoys who, being in a minority, were not capable of forcing through the Lithuanian demands 129 . Moreover, the Lithuanians resisted participating in other important conventions and political events during the fi rst three interregna. As rightly suggested by H. Lulewicz, the Lithuanian magnates in this way executed their "own project of the union rejected during the negotiations prior to the seym of Lublin by the Crown. Th e project assumed that common Polish-Lithuanian seyms should take place only in reference to the most important issues such as the election of a new king or in the event of war against a common enemy" 130 [transl. A.Ch.]. Undoubtedly, the Lithuanian magnates insisted on participating in the common election of the monarch. However, each time they put forward their far-reaching strictly defi ned conditions of participation, which forced the impatient Crown dignitaries in the second and third interregna to elect the monarch on their own, without any Lithuanian participation 131 . Th e Lithuanians opposed, arguing that the regulations of the union seym had been breached, which was not true 132 . Th e Lithuanian magnates willingly raised the question of their lack of participation in the election of Stefan Báthory during the third interregnum 133 . Aft er the split election of August 1587 during which two hostile groups of senators and noble electors chose respectively Sigismund III Vasa and Archduke Maximilian to become king, the Lithuanian dignitaries put forward a bizarre solution. Th ey suggested that the monarch be elected at random from among three candidates: Sigismund III Vasa, Maximilian and the Muscovite tsar Fiodor. Obviously, the idea was categorically rejected 134 . Another point included in the act of the union of 1569, which was to underline the autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuanian in the relationship with Poland, referred to retaining the title of the Lithuanian duke next to the title of the Polish To m a s z K e m p a [620] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l place during frequent interregna 157 . It was during these conventions that the program of the reform of the union took shape. Still, it was the Lithuanian magnates that exerted the biggest infl uence on the "reform of the union". As it turned out, in fact the "reform of the union" did not concern the foundations of the relationship between Poland and Lithuania. Th e Lithuanian dignitaries and szlachta did not aim at altering the content of the most import act of union signed on 1 July 1569. What is more, there is no evidence that any of the Lithuanian magnates intended to break away the union with Poland. What the Lithuanians wanted was to regain the territories taken away by the Crown in 1569: Podlachia, Volhynia, the Bratslav land and the Kievan land which, as we know, never took place. Another aspiration of the Lithuanian politicians was the confi rmation and in some cases the extension of the autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (for example, the prohibition preventing foreigners from holding Lithuanian offi ces -including the prevention of Poles from holding separate Lithuanian convocations). Th e momentous event for the autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was the confi rmation of the III Lithuanian Statute in 1588, which extended the sovereignty of Lithuania. Th e negative emotions between Poles and Lithuanians started to decrease. Th e Lithuanians became less critical of the Poles. However, it must be remembered that the criticism resulted from the humiliation infl icted on Lithuania in Lublin by the incorporation of vast territories belonging to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into Poland. It infl uenced and still infl uences the general opinion concerning the PolishLithuanian union among our Lithuanian neighbours.
Translated from Polish by Agnieszka Chabros
157 H. Lulewicz, Poselstwa, 86 Th e issue regarding "the reform of the union" of Lublin... [621] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l PROBLEM "NAPRAWY UNII" LUBELSKIEJ W POLITYCE LITEWSKIEJ W TRZECH PIERWSZYCH BEZKRÓLEWIACH PO ŚMIERCI KRÓLA ZYGMUNTA AUGUSTA (1572-1588) Streszczenie Słowa kluczowe: unia lubelska, partykularyzm, bezkrólewie, Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie, Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów Unia lubelska, zawarta w 1569 r. między Polską a Litwą, stworzyła z obu państw rodzaj federacji ze wspólnym władcą, wybieranym przez szlachtę z obu państw, a ponadto ze wspólnym parlamentem, a także jednolitą polityką zagraniczną i obronną. Odgrywający główną rolę w polityce Litwy magnaci -w przeciwieństwie do litewskiej szlachty -nie byli w pełni zadowoleni z tych unijnych postanowień. Wcześniej chcieli związku z Polską bardziej luźnego, z zachowaniem odrębnych systemów parlamentarnych przez oba pań-stwa. Niemniej wyraźne poparcie króla Zygmunta Augusta dla idei planu ściślejszej unii, forsowanego przez Polaków, przesądziło o kształcie tej nowej unii. Dodatkowo w związku z zawarciem unii Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie utraciło w 1569 r. obszerne ziemie: kijowską, wołyńska, brasławską i podlaską, w sumie ponad 1/3 terytorium państwa. Właśnie ten fakt był dla litewskich dygnitarzy szczególnie upokarzający, gdyż odbyło się na żąda-nie Polaków, spełnione przez króla, a mimo ostrych litewskich protestów. Stąd po śmierci Zygmunta Augusta w okresie kolejnych bezkrólewi (1572-1573, 1575-1576, 1586-1587) czołowi magnaci litewscy, szczególnie Mikołaj Radziwiłł "Rudy", Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Sierotka", Jan Chodkiewicz, dążyli do odzyskania tych ziem, określając ewentualne urzeczywistnienie tych dążeń "naprawą unii". Okazało się jednak, że bez dostatecznego poparcia ze strony szlachty i magnatów z tych inkorporowanych do Polski w 1569 r. ziem Litwini nie są w stanie zrealizować swego politycznego projektu. Pod terminem "naprawa unii" litewscy politycy rozumieli też jednak inne zmiany, które zapewniłyby Wielkiemu Księstwu Litewskiemu bardziej równorzędną pozycję w unii z Polską. Niewiele związanych z tym postulatów litewskich zostało jednak spełnionych przez polską stronę i kolejnych monarchów. Ważnym wydarzeniem z tego punktu widzenia stało się jednak zatwierdzenie przez króla Zygmunta III w 1588 r. nowej kodyfi kacji prawa litewskiego (III Statut), która utwierdzała, a w pewnych punktach poszerzała nawet pole litewskiej autonomii.
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To m a s z K e m p a [622] w w w . z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e . p l Aus diesem Grund strebten führende litauische Magnaten, insbesondere Mikołaj Radziwiłł "Rudy", Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Sierotka" und Jan Chodkiewicz danach, diese Länder zurückzugewinnen und bezeichneten die eventuelle Verwirklichung dieser Forderungen als "Reform der Union". Es zeigte sich aber, dass die Litauer ohne hinreichende Unterstützung seitens der Szlachta und der Magnaten jener inkorporierten Gebiete ihr Projekt nicht umsetzen konnten. Unter dem Begriff "Reform der Union" verstanden die litauischen Politiker jedoch auch andere Veränderungen, welche dem Großfürstentum Litauen eine stärker gleichrangige Stellung in der Union mit Polen gesichert hätten. Nur wenige der damit verbundenen litauischen Forderungen wurden jedoch von der polnischen Seite und den nachfolgenden Monarchen erfüllt. Ein bedeutendes Ereignis in dieser Hinsicht stellte allerdings die Bestätigung der neuen Kodifi kation des litauischen Rechts (III. litauisches Statut) durch König Sigismund III. im Jahre 1588 dar, welches die Reichweite der litauischen Autonomie befestigten und in einigen Punkten sogar erweiterte.
